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On June 12, 2009, the United States
Congress passed the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (S.
982), granting the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) authority regulating
tobacco products. The idea of FDA
regulation of tobacco has broad [1], but
not unanimous, support among medical
and public health professionals. This law
has many strengths (Table 1): it grants the
FDA general authority over tobacco
products, including the ability to reduce
(but not eliminate) nicotine, requires
improved warning labels on cigarette and
other tobacco packages, and implements
the rules limiting marketing of tobacco
products to youth that the FDA issued in
1996. It also repeals pre-emption of state
and local regulation of tobacco marketing
and advertising, and grants states and
localities broad rights to regulate or
prohibit the sale, distribution, possession,
exposure to, access to, or use of tobacco
products.
The new FDA law is a compromise
between tobacco control organizations
and the Philip Morris tobacco company
that has its origins in the failed 1997
‘‘global settlement’’ negotiated to settle
litigation against the tobacco industry
[2,3]. These organizations and their Con-
gressional allies believed that the only way
to win regulatory authority over tobacco
products was to compromise with the
tobacco industry. Some of the compro-
mises, such as prohibiting the FDA from
eliminating all nicotine from tobacco prod-
ucts, requiring a prescription for tobacco
products, or banning them outright
(Table 1) do not create overly burdensome
regulatory hurdles or fundamental long-
term advantages or legitimacy for the
industry. Other provisions, however, do.
Lessons from Past Compromises
with the Tobacco Industry
The FDA Act is not the first time that
public health advocates have compromised
with tobacco companies to pass legislation.
History demonstrates that the tobacco
companies think in the long term and,
when forced, will accept short-term set-
backs to protect long-term interests.
The first federal health legislation ad-
dressing tobacco was the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, passed in
1965. This law, passed in the wake of
growing public concern triggered by the
original 1964 Surgeon General’s report
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Summary Points
N On June 12, 2009, the US Congress passed compromise legislation granting the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jurisdiction over tobacco products,
repealing federal pre-emption of state and local regulation of tobacco
advertising, and requiring graphical warning labels on tobacco products.
N Past legislative compromises with the tobacco industry have led to short-term
public health gains at the expense of long-term progress.
N The law offers the tobacco industry an opportunity to rehabilitate its image and
products because they are now ‘‘FDA regulated.’’
N Tobacco interests that have violated US racketeering law are inappropriately
represented on the Scientific Advisory Committee that influences FDA
regulations.
N The challenge for the compromise law’s advocates will be to accept
responsibility for these problems and see that their negative consequences
do not materialize.
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cancer (in men), which accelerated calls for
restrictions on cigarette marketing at all
levels of government around the country
([4], p. 205), mandated now-familiar (and
worn-out) ‘‘Surgeon General’s Warnings’’
on the side of cigarette packages and, later,
in cigarette advertising.
While this legislation was viewed as a
step forward, it was the tobacco companies
who emerged as the long-run winners. The
price of the law was federal pre-emption of
any controls on cigarette advertising ([5],
pp. 254–257), including at the state or local
level. The result was to choke off all
subsequent local efforts that had anything
to do with cigarette advertising. The
warning labels also provided the tobacco
companies an important defense in court to
fight liability for the disease and death that
their products cause. At the time the FDA
bill passed—44 years later—the US still
had the weakest, least effective warning
labels in the world [6]. Indeed, one of the
arguments for the FDA bill was that it
required graphical warning labels and
repealed this pre-emption [7].
The next compromise came in 1970,
when health advocates worked with tobac-
co companies to remove cigarette advertis-
ing from television and radio. This com-
promise, too, turned out to be a strategic
error because once the pro-tobacco adver-
tisements were gone, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ‘‘Fairness Doctrine’’
that had required free anti-smoking mes-
sages to counter the tobaccoadvertisements
no longer applied. These anti-smoking
advertisements were having a more pro-
found effect on consumers than the ciga-
rette advertisements and the industry
wanted them gone [8]. The tobacco
companies simply shifted their marketing
to other venues and public health messages
disappeared from the airwaves.
The one unequivocal public health
success won against tobacco in Congress
was legislation making airline flights
smoke-free (in 1988 for flights of two
hours or less, in 1989 for flights of six
hours or less, and in 2000 for all flights to
and from the US), despite vehement
opposition from the tobacco industry
([5], pp. 303–306). Not only did these
laws improve the health and comfort of
the flying public and flight attendants for
whom airliners were workplaces, but they
contributed to the declining social accept-
ability of smoking, which reduces smoking.
The New FDA Law
There are many elements of this new
legislation that could prove problematic in
achieving effective control of tobacco prod-
ucts and their manufacturers (Table 1). The
law imposes strong pre-emption (except fire
safety standards) of state and local govern-
ments with respect to product standards,
premarket approval, adulteration, mis-
branding, labeling registration, and good
manufacturing standards. Pre-emption is a
key tobacco industry strategy for preventing
innovation and development of strong
tobacco control policies [9]. Indeed, it was
the lack of such pre-emption that permitted
states to develop and implement fire safety
standards for cigarettes while the industry
effectively blocked federal action. This pre-
emption could block the emerging move-
ment to regulate cigarette butts as toxic
waste [10].
While nominally giving the Secretary
broad authority to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts and their promotion, the law estab-
lishes procedures that will make it difficult
to issue meaningful regulations. Rather
than an unequivocal charge to protect the
public health, the regulations must consid-
er, among other things, ‘‘technical achiev-
ability’’ and the possibility of ‘‘creating a
significant demand for contraband’’ (Table
1). These requirements provide fertile
ground for years of lawsuits against any
regulation the industry opposes [11].
Evidence in millions of pages of tobacco
industry documents now publicly available
demonstrates that Philip Morris has been
planning for FDA legislation for well over a
decade and illustrates how such regulation
fits into its business plan [12,13]. Even a
perfect (from a public health perspective) law
would benefit Philip Morris because it will
tend to perpetuate the status quo and Philip
Morris is the market leader. Philip Morris’s
apparent reasons for supporting FDA regu-
lation, however, extend well beyond this
fact. In 1998, a Philip Morris legal white
paper, ‘‘Design, Manufacturing and Mar-
keting of Tobacco Products: Towards a
Sensible Regulatory Framework,’’ explained
that ‘‘reasonable’’ FDA authority ‘‘would
continue to permit adults to assume the
inherent risks of smoking, while allocating to
the government the twin tasks of ensuring
that manufacturers don’t create additional
risk through their design and manufacturing
processes, on the one hand, and continuing
to conduct appropriate research about the
nature of the inherent risks and keeping
consumers informed of them on the other’’
[emphasis in original] [14]. Like warning
labels, this white paper appears to suggest
that Philip Morris anticipated the legislation
would help shift liability from cigarette
companies for the dangers of smoking and
place responsibility for informing consumers
of the risk upon the government.
In 1996, Philip Morris implemented
Project Sunrise, an 11-year-plan to restore
its reputation as a ‘‘responsible company,’’
to maintain its political influence (the key
to survival for any tobacco company), to
recruit quality staff, and to maintain its
customer base [13]. Publicizing the death
and destruction the tobacco industry
causes has been a staple of effective
tobacco control media campaigns, begin-
ning in California [15] and used to strong
effect in the American Legacy Founda-
tion’s ‘‘truth’’ campaign [16,17,18]. In-
deed, distrust of tobacco companies is a
powerful message to prevent smoking and
to stimulate cessation attempts [19,20].
A particularly problematic aspect of the
law is the Tobacco Products Scientific
Advisory Committee that is required to
include nonvoting members from the
tobacco manufacturers and growers. The
Committee is charged with advising the
Secretary of Health and Human Services
on, among other things, questions regard-
ing nicotine dependence, whether menthol
(present in about 70% of cigarettes smoked
by African Americans [21]) should be
removed from tobacco products, and on
virtually all regulations and health issues
relating to tobacco products. This commit-
tee will play an important role in adjudi-
cating complex and controversial scientific
issues about whether meaningful ‘‘harm
reduction’’ is possible with tobacco prod-
ucts through product modification at a time
that there is little to no scientific literature
on the actual links between a variety of
tobacco-related diseases and specific ingre-
dients.Beforepromulgatingany regulation,
the Secretary is required to afford the
Committee an opportunity to submit
recommendations with respect to the
proposed regulations.
While industry representatives partici-
pate as nonvoting members of other FDA
scientific advisory committees, there is
significant negative historical precedent
for the effects of including tobacco industry
representatives in this committee. In 1968
the National Cancer Institute created the
Tobacco Working Group (TWG), which
included health experts and industry rep-
resentatives, to advise its Smoking and
Health Program ([22], pp. 155–162). Fed-
eral District Judge Gladys Kessler summa-
rized how the industry used its TWG
membership in the Group in her 2006
ruling that Philip Morris and other ele-
ments of the tobacco industry violated the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act: ‘‘Participation
by industry representatives proved valuable
[to the industry] by allowing Defendants to
keep abreast of what the United States
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 2 July 2009 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e1000118Government was doing with respect to
smoking and health issues. Their participa-
tion also provided a mechanism by which
defendants could try to influence the
United States Government’s activities in
the smoking and health area…The [rack-
eteering] Enterpriseengaged ina concerted
effort to prevent, curtail, and ultimately to
neutralize the TWG’s efforts to evaluate
cigarettes’ [health] effects using an animal
bioassay…’’ ([23], "334, 337). This indus-
try is not known for its honesty in the
scientific arena [24–37] and, accordingly,
has no legitimate place as inside partici-
pants in FDA rule-making.
Table 1. Major provisions of FDA law (S. 982, June 12, 2009).
Positive Negative
Gives Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to issue regulations
regarding existing tobacco products and premarketing approval of new
tobacco products and assigns regulatory authority to the FDA (1101)
Includes strong federal pre-emption (except fire safety standards) provisions of
state and local governments with respect to product standards, premarket
approval, adulteration, misbranding, labeling registration, and good manufacturing
standards (1916(a))
Grandfathers from premarketing approval all tobacco products commercially
marketed as of February 15, 2007 (1905(j)) and some products introduced within 21
months of law taking effect (1910(a)(2)(B))
Gives the Secretary authority to impose restrictions on advertising and
promotion of tobacco products (1906(d)(1))
Prohibits requiring a prescription for tobacco products (1906(d)(1))
Requires the Secretary to issue regulations on the promotion, marketing, sale,
and distribution of tobacco products by means other than a direct, face-to-
face exchange between a retailer and a consumer (1906(d)(4))
Empowers Secretary to issue tobacco product standards for all tobacco
products (1907)
Bans use of many flavoring agents (e.g., strawberry, chocolate, coffee)
(1907(a)(1)(A))
Excludes menthol
a (1907(a)1A)
Empowers Secretary to require the reduction or elimination of tobacco
constituents and harmful components of tobacco products (1907(a)(4))
Prohibits requiring reduction of nicotine to zero (1907(d)(3)(B))
Requires Secretary to consider in promulgating regulations ‘‘technical achievability’’
(1907(b)(1), 907(d)(2)), the possibility of ‘‘the creation of a significant demand for
contraband’’ (1907(b)(2)), and choosing an effective date ‘‘to minimize, consistent
with public health, economic loss to, and disruption of or dislocation of, domestic
and international trade’’ (1907(d)(2))
Prohibits banning all cigarettes, smokeless products, cigars, etc. (1907(d)(3)(A))
Requires Secretary of Health to invite Secretary of Agriculture to provide
information and analysis regarding any proposed tobacco product standard
(1907(c)(2)(D)), even though Secretary of Health is prohibited from issuing
regulations regarding growing, cultivation, or curing of raw tobacco (14)
Repeals current federal pre-emption of state and local authority to issue rules
regulating marketing and advertising, and grants to states broad rights to
regulate or prohibit the sale, distribution, possession, exposure to, access to,
or use of tobacco products (1916(a)(1), 203)
Pre-empts state and local regulation of product, except as it relates to fire safety
(1916(a)(1))
Creates 12-member Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee, which
plays a central role in reviewing all proposed scientific findings and regulations
(1917(a))
Requires 3 nonvoting members be representatives of tobacco interests (2
manufacturers and 1 grower) (1917(b)(1)(A)(iv–vi)); limits conflict-of-interest
disqualification to only 18 months prior to appointment to the Committee
(1917(b)(1)(C))
Establishes user fees paid by tobacco companies to fund regulatory activities
(1919)
No adjustment for inflation after 2019 (1919(b)(1)(K)), potentially limiting resources
for future regulation
Implements the restrictions on marketing to youth the FDA issued in 1996
(1102(a))
Prohibits free sampling of smokeless tobacco at football, basketball, baseball,
soccer, or hockey events (1102(d)(3)(B))
Allows free sampling at other venues, including rodeos and stock car races
a
(1102(d)(3)(B))
Rules issued on sales to minors exempt from Congressional review under
Administrative Procedures Act (1102(a)(7))
All other rules are subject to Congressional review
Manufacturers may not make statements through the advertising or media
directed to consumers ‘‘that could result in consumers believing that the
product is endorsed for use by the Food and Drug Administration or in
consumers being misled about the harmfulness of the product because of
such regulation, inspection, or compliance’’
b (1103(tt))
The Supreme Court [42] has found that commercial speech may be regulated by the
government only if it is false or misleading; First Amendment protection may be
afforded to statements of the existence of FDA regulation, based on this precedent
Mandates large graphical warnings on the front and back of packages
(1201, 204)
aThese provisions can be strengthened through the rule-making process.
bAsserting the right to use the fact that their products are regulated by the FDA in advertising may have been the reason that Michael Szymanczyk, Chairman and CEO of
Altria (Philip Morris USA’s parent company) wrote, in his letter endorsing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, ‘‘we have repeatedly expressed First
Amendment reservations about certain provisions, including those that could restrict a manufacturer’s ability to truthfully communicate about tobacco products’’ [43].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000118.t001
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quote Judge Kessler’s conclusions on the
industry’s marketing to youth, it is silent
on her extensive findings on the industry’s
corruption of science ([23], "3864, 3871,
3877, 3897, 3907, 3731). In particular,
Judge Kessler found that not only had the
industry engaged in these illegal practices
in the past, but that they were continuing
to do so and likely to continue to do so in
the future ([23], pp. 1601–1612).
On May 22, 2009, after the Senate
Health Committee finished its work on the
bill but before the vote in the full Senate,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
unanimously upheld Judge Kessler’s ruling
in strong terms: ‘‘Defendants knew of their
falsity at the time and made the statements
with intent to deceive. Thus, we are not
dealing with accidental falsehoods or
sincere attempts to persuade; defendants’
liability rests on deceits perpetrated with
knowledge of their falsity’’ ([38], p. 42).
These findings by an impartial judiciary
(and the evidence they are based on) justify
excluding industry representatives from
serving on this committee as participants
inside the FDA rule-making process.
Including tobacco growers on the com-
mittee—and the requirement that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services
consult with the Secretary of Agriculture
on proposed rules—is even stranger. The
proposed law specifically excludes regula-
tion of tobacco leaf not in the possession of
a manufacturer of tobacco products.
Clearly, these provisions have no rational
basis to the stated intent of the legislation
or the mission of the FDA.
Implications for Global Tobacco
Control
Including the tobacco industry in this
committee also violates Article 5.3 of the
World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
[39], the first global public health treaty,
which has been ratified by 164 nations. (The
US has signed, but not yet ratified the
treaty.) In recognition of the tobacco
industry’s corrosive influence on govern-
ment, FCTC Article 5.3 commits parties to
protecting tobacco control policy and devel-
opment from the tobacco industry. The
implementing guidelines for FCTC Article
5.3 are unequivocal: ‘‘Parties should not
allow any person employed by the tobacco
industry or any entity working to further its
interests to be a member of any government
body, committee or advisory group that sets
or implements tobacco control or public
health policy’’ ([40], 123.4.8).
Ironically, many of the US groups that
pushed the current FDA bill also worked
hard to win a strong FCTC and are urging
US ratification of the treaty [39]. The
multinational tobacco companies will al-
most certainly use the precedent in the
FDA bill to undermine implementation of
the FCTC elsewhere, particularly since
leading health advocates in the United
States have been publicly defending this
provision. Even though the US is not yet a
party to the FCTC, US advocates must
consider the global public health impacts
of their actions here.
Recognizing Changed
Circumstances
Finally, the basic terms of the bill were
negotiated several years ago, in a wholly
different political climate. At that time, it
appeared that Republicans would domi-
nate government well into the future. The
2008 election represented a sea change in
American politics, including a President
who has repeatedly emphasized his com-
mitment to respecting science, depoliticiz-
ing the role of science in government
decision-making, and rejoining the inter-
national community. This FDA legislation
does not acknowledge this changed political
climate or recognize the opportunity it
created to accomplish more than when the
bill was originally negotiated. Advocates for
the bill also did not press the implications of
the strong Court of Appeals decision
upholding Judge Kessler’s ruling that the
tobacco companies were racketeers to
remove industry representatives from the
Scientific Advisory Committee.
In July 1963, six months before the 1964
Surgeon General’s report was released
([22], pp. 50–52), the Director of Public
Relations at Brown and Williamson To-
bacco wrote his colleagues that ‘‘The
consensus is that the industry is in a ‘grave
crisis,’ and the philosophy is ‘to expect the
worst and work for the best.’ Of course, the
greatest cause for alarm is the forthcoming
Surgeon General’s report, which is expect-
ed to be detrimental to the industry…
because indications point to a strong
indictment of tobacco, with possible ‘root
shaking’ consequences…[There are] feel-
ings of frustration, inadequacy, and fear
that exist among those engaged in repre-
senting the tobacco industry…’’ [41].
Rather than mustering the political will to
realize the vulnerable industry’s worst fears,
Congress enacted the 1965 Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act, which
protected the industry for half a century. It
could be an even greater mistake to have
missed the opportunity to enact FDA
regulation of tobacco products that actually
reins in the industry’s largest player rather
than enacting an insurance policy for the
industry’s future. We, after all, have insight
into what Philip Morris wants from this bill
and how it may serve their long-term
interests in maximizing sales of cigarettes
and other tobacco products [12,13].
Smoke-free airlines show that a united
public health community, working with
Congress, can beat the tobacco industry.
The repeal of pre-emption of state and
local regulation of tobacco advertising
and the requirement for graphical health
warnings represents ac l e a rs t e pf o r w a r d .
The public health community had built
exceptionally strong public support for
the idea of FDA regulation of tobacco. A
pro-health president, committed to legit-
imate science and re-entering the global
community, and strong findings from the
courts that the tobacco industry repre-
sents an ongoing racketeering enterprise
should have helped.
The effectiveness with which the FDA
will be able to regulate tobacco products,
however, remains in doubt and the law
offers the tobacco industry an opportunity
to rehabilitate its image and products
because they are now ‘‘FDA regulated.’’
Most concerning, the precedent of the
United States enacting a law that violates
Article 5.3 of the FCTC ([40], 123.4.8),
with active support of major public health
groups and pro-health Congressional lead-
ers, could undermine international tobac-
co control efforts.
The challenge for the compromise law’s
advocates will be to accept responsibility
for these problems and work to ensure that
their negative consequences do not mate-
rialize.
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